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Abstract
This paper presents a new framework for analyzing and designing no-
regret algorithms for dynamic (possibly adversarial) systems. The proposed
framework generalizes the popular online convex optimization framework
and extends it to its natural limit allowing it to capture a notion of regret
that is intuitive for more general problems such as those encountered in
game theory and variational inequalities. The framework hinges on a
special choice of a system-wide loss function we have developed. Using this
framework, we prove that a simple update scheme provides a no-regret
algorithm for monotone systems. While previous results in game theory
prove individual agents can enjoy unilateral no-regret guarantees, our result
proves monotonicity sufficient for guaranteeing no-regret when considering
the adjustments of multiple agent strategies in parallel. Furthermore, to our
knowledge, this is the first framework to provide a suitable notion of regret
for variational inequalities. Most importantly, our proposed framework
ensures monotonicity a sufficient condition for employing multiple online
learners safely in parallel.
0.1 Introduction
Online optimization frameworks developed for online learning have enabled
the design of simple, efficient, no-regret (i.e., sub-linear regret) algorithms
for solitary agents in potentially adversarial environments. These frameworks
elegantly capture theoretical properties of the online learning problem and provide
practitioners with scalable solutions to a number of real-world problems (e.g.,
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online advertising), however, none of these frameworks was expressly designed to
approach the online learning problem for groups of agents or dynamical systems
in general. While results from current online optimization frameworks naturally
provide unilateral regret bounds for singular agents by treating all other agents as
part of the environment, these bounds are not adequate for answering important
questions such as, "How poor is my team of online learners with respect to the
best team"? This question is especially important to distributed system design
in possibly adversarial environments and arises in a variety of research fields
such as game theory, multi-agent RL, variational inequalities, machine learning,
and economics.
The famous Blackwell Approachability Theorem [5] provides conditions
under which an algorithm exists ensuring the individual targets (e.g., rewards)
of multiple agents approach a convex set Z. Specifically, if after observing an
adversary’s play at each time step there exists a set of agent strategies that
results in a set of targets z ∈ Z, then there exists an algorithm producing
targets whose average in the limit is at a distance zero from Z. While this
result appears to fill the gap described above, it has recently been shown that
Blackwell Approachability is equivalent to online linear optimization (OLO) in a
strong sense [1]1. Furthermore, the associated approachability algorithm requires
access to a halfspace oracle or potential function which assumes some level of
cooperation among agents. In this work, we focus on developing a framework
for designing distributed (or selfish) algorithms and so this is inadequate for our
needs.
In developing a new framework we will need to restrict ourselves to domains
satisfying specific properties that allow the design of simple, efficient, no-regret
algorithms. Therefore, the study of actually constructing appropriate domains,
known as mechanism design in game theory and economics, is intimately related
to our work [4]. A mechanism is incentive compatible if individual agent rewards
are maximized when acting according to true preferences. In other words, a
mechanism is incentive compatible if the goal (e.g., system-wide honesty) is
compatible with the incentivized behavior (e.g., profit maximization). In this
work, the system-wide goal is low aggregate team loss and the incentivized
behavior is selfish loss minimization.
This work makes two contributions. The first is an online learning framework
for monotone maps, namely online monotone optimization, which generalizes
the popular framework of online convex optimization and provides a foundation
for algorithm design in the multi-agent setting, variational inequality setting,
and others. The second is a simple, efficient, no-regret, distributed algorithm
suitable for the newly developed framework. We begin with a brief background
on convex analysis, monotone maps, variational inequalities, and online convex
optimization (OCO). Section 2 presents the new online monotone optimization
framework (OMO) along with a proof showing OMO is a strict superset of
OCO. We also discuss in detail the meaning behind various components of the
framework. Section 3 derives a simple, efficient, no-regret algorithm for the
1OLO ⊂ OCO
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proposed framework and Section 4 demonstrates our contribution in solving a
dynamic variational inequality problem. We finish with a discussion of results
and future work.
1 Technical Background
First, we’ll provide some useful tools and results from convex analysis, monotone
operator theory, variational inequalities, and online convex optimization.
We denote the norm of a vector x by ||x|| and its dual norm by ||x||∗ =
max{〈x′, x〉 : ||x′|| ≤ 1}. A set is convex if tx+(1−t)x′ ∈ X ∀x, x′ ∈ X , t ∈ [0, 1].
All sets we consider are convex.
The subdifferential of a function f : X ⊂ Rn → R at x, denoted ∂f(x), is the
set of all subgradients at x: ∂f(x) = {z : 〈z, x′ − x〉 ≤ f(x′) − f(x) ∀x′ ∈ X}.
f is L-Lipschitz over X if |f(x′)− f(x)| ≤ L||x′ − x|| or equivalently if ||z||∗ ≤
L ∀x, x′ ∈ X ,∀z ∈ ∂f(x). f is convex if 〈z − z′, x − x′〉 ≥ 0 ∀x, x′ ∈ X , z ∈
∂f(x), z′ ∈ ∂f(x′)2.
A set valued map F : X ⊂ Rn → {z ∈ Z ⊂ Rn} is Lipschitz over X if
||F (x′) − F (x)|| ≤ L||x′ − x|| ∀x, x′ ∈ X or equivalently if ||z||∗ ≤ L ∀x, x′ ∈
X ,∀z ∈ F (x). F is monotone if 〈z − z′, x − x′〉 ≥ 0 ∀x, x′ ∈ X , z ∈ F (x), z′ ∈
F (x′) [3]. Alternatively, if F is differentiable and the Jacobian of F is positive
semi-definite, F is monotone [12, 17]. By our defintions, F is guaranteed to be
integrable over finite length paths through the domain X . F is conservative if
the integral along any closed contour in X is zero: ∮ 〈F, dx〉 = 03. Equivalently,
F is conservative if it is path-independent meaning the integral along a contour
between any two points in X doesn’t depend on the contour itself. Conversely,
if F is path-dependent or ∃x ∈ X such that ∮ 〈F, dx〉 6= 0, then F is not
conservative.
Clearly, by definition, the subdifferential of a convex function is a monotone
set valued map, but the converse is not necessarily true. If F is monotone and
conservative, then F is the subdifferential of some convex function [16], however,
not all monotone maps are conservative. We provide one such example in the next
section. We emphasize this point to convince the reader that monotone maps
are capable of representing problems not readily captured by convex functions.
A more thorough discussion relating monotone maps to subdifferentials can be
found in [16].
In Section 4 we demonstrate our framework on a variational inequality
(VI) problem so we introduce VIs here. The variational inequality problem,
VI(F,X ), is to find x∗ such that 〈F (x∗), x − x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X . VI’s are used
to model equilibrium problems in a number of domains including mechanics,
traffic networks, economics, and game theory. In our notation, x∗ constitutes
an equilibrium point. It is known that the solution set, X ∗, to VI(F,X ) with
monotone F is a convex, compact set [6]. We refer the reader to [15] for a
2convexity is typically presented as f(tx+ (1− t)x′) ≤ tf(x) + (1− t)f(x′), but the form
we present better suits the transition to OMO.
3colloquially known as the fundamental theorem of calculus for line integrals.
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Figure 1: The sketch on the left represents the gradient map of a convex function
(e.g., x2 + y2) while the sketch on the right is of a circular vector field. Both
are monotone maps, however, the blue and red contour integrals in the left
sketch are over a conservative map and so they both evaluate to zero (path-
independent). In contrast, the blue and red contour integrals in the right sketch
are over a non-conservative monotone map and possibly evaluate to different
values (path-dependent).
detailed study of the relationship between convex functions, monotone operators,
and variational inequalities and to [11, 12, 8] for an extensive study of VIs.
Geometrically, monotonicity implies X ∗ is a global monotone attractor [12].
Figure 1 demonstrates a few of the aforementioned properties of monotonicity
as it may be a new concept to some readers.
Online convex optimization (OCO) is a framework for studying the online
learning problem when losses are convex with respect to the prediction domain
which is also a convex set. The learning problem is defined in Algorithm 1.
We refer the reader to the survey by Shalev-Shwartz [18] for a review of OCO.
The standard no-regret algorithm for OCO is online gradient (mirror) descent;
online gradient descent (OGD) is described in Algorithm 2. The regret of
an online learning algorithm A predicting the sequence xt after T steps is
formally defined as regretAT (X ) =
∑T
t=1 ft(xt)−minu∈X
∑T
t=1 ft(u). Assuming
each ft is Lt-Lipschitz and X = {x : ||x||2 ≤ B}, it has been shown that
regretOGDT ≤ BL
√
2T where L2 ≥ 1T
∑T
t=1 L
2
t [18].
2 New Framework
We are now ready to present our online monotone optimization framework
(Algorithm 3). Here we denote x : ot → xt as x taking the straight line path
from ot to xt through X and x : ot  xt as taking an arbitrary path (continuous,
finite length). Comparing OMO to OCO, we see that the major difference is that
we now receive a loss function implicitly defined by a monotone map whereas in
OCO, we receive a convex loss function directly. We will now show that OMO is
strictly more general than OCO.
Theorem 1. OCO(ft, X) is equivalent to OMO(∂ft,X ) and ∃Ft such that
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Algorithm 1 Online Convex Optimiza-
tion (OCO)
input: A convex set X
for t = 1, 2, . . . do
predict a vector xt ∈ X
receive a convex loss function ft :
X → R
suffer loss ft(xt)
end for
Algorithm 2 Online Gradient De-
scent (OGD)
input: A scalar learning rate η > 0
x1 = 0
for t = 1, 2, . . . do
xt+1 = xt − ηzt where zt ∈
∂ft(xt)
end for
Algorithm 3 Online Monotone Optimization (OMO)
input: A convex set X
for t = 1, 2, . . . do
predict a vector xt ∈ X
receive a monotone mapping Ft : X → X with reference vector, ot, and
reference scalar, fot
suffer loss ft(xt) = fot +
∫
x:ot→xt〈Ft, dx〉
end for
5
OMO(Ft,X ) 6∈ OCO(ft,X ) ∀ft implying OCO ⊂ OMO in the strict sense.
Proof. First, we show that OMO simplifies to OCO when the monotone map
Ft is restricted to be conservative. We know from Section 1 that Ft is the
subdifferential of some convex function (to within a constant). Let ft be the
convex function whose subdifferential is Ft and whose value at ot is fot (i.e.,
ft(ot) = fot). We also know that a conservative map is path-independent. The
following steps illustrate the reduction to OCO by existence of the subdiffer-
ential, path-independence, and canceling integration constants. This is simply
a straightforward application of the fundamental theorem of calculus for line
integrals.
fot +
∫
x:ot→xt
〈Ft, dx〉 = fot +
∫
x:ot→xt
〈∂ft, dx〉 (1)
= fot +
∫
x:ot xt
〈∂ft, dx〉 (2)
= fot + ft(xt)− ft(ot) (3)
= ft(xt) (4)
In other words, to execute OCO under the OMO framework, simply pass the
subdifferential of the convex function as the monotone map and everything else
remains the same.
Now that we know OMO contains OCO, we’ll prove OMO is a strict superset
of OCO by identifying an element of OMO that lies outside OCO. The counterex-
ample we provide is a 2 player, 2 action game where the loss functions seen by
both players at each time step t are kept constant. Player 1 attempts to minimize
the loss 13r
3
t − 12r2t ct + rtc2t by adjusting rt ∈ [0, 1], and player 2 attempts to
minimize the loss 13c
3
t − 12c2t rt + ctr2t by adjusting ct ∈ [0, 1]. The corresponding
map is just the concatenation of their gradients, Ft(xt) =
( r2t−rtct+c2t
r2t−rtct+c2t
)
with
xt =
(
rt
ct
)
and X = [0, 1]2. The Jacobian of Ft is
(
2rt−ct 2ct−rt
2rt−ct 2ct−rt
)
, which is
positive semi-definite over X , hence monotone. Let ot = (1, 1) and fot = 0.
We will evaluate ft(x) under the OMO framework and show it is non-convex
for this counterexample proving this problem is outside the reach of OCO yet
still within reach of OMO.
ft(x) = fot +
∫
x:ot→xt
〈Ft, dx〉 (5)
=
∫ 1
0
〈Ft(ot + τ(xt − ot)), (xt − ot)dτ〉 (6)
=
1
3
r3t −
1
2
r2t + rtct −
1
2
c2t +
1
3
c3t −
2
3
(7)
Hessian(ft(x)) =
(
2rt−1 1
1 2ct−1
)
with Det ≤ 0 over X which implies ft(x) is a
saddle surface.
From this viewpoint, OMO can be considered a specific version of online
non-convex optimization. While there has been work on developing no-regret
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algorithms for specific non-convex formulations [19], our focus is on extending
OCO to its limit. In other words, we argue monotonicity rather than convexity
is the natural boundary for developing simple, efficient online optimization
algorithms which will be apparent in our algorithm design.
2.1 Discussion of Losses and Regret in OMO
The OMO loss is implicitly defined by the monotone map Ft. In physics, this
loss would be recognized as the work required to move a particle from ot to
xt along a straight line path through field Ft. With respect to the multi-
agent example given above, this loss represents the aggregate reward gained
by both agents when linearly converting their strategies from xt to ot. This
is because the map Ft is simply the concatenation of the gradients from each
agent’s expected reward function. In this scenario, we can rewrite our loss as
ft(xt) =
∑N
i=1
∫
x:ot→xt〈∂V
(i)
t (x), dx
(i)〉 where i ranges over the agents 1, . . . , N
and ∂V (i)t (x) is the subdifferential of agent i’s expected reward function with
respect to its strategy x(i)t evaluated at x. At this point, straight line paths may
seem an arbitrary choice for the contour, so we explain this choice in detail.
One reason for defining our loss with straight line paths is that it upper
bounds an arguably more intuitive loss we are interested in. First, we define
the straight line path, ~P , explicitly as ~P (ot, xt) = argminP˜ (ot,xt)
∫
P˜ (ot,xt)
α||P˜ ||,
α ∈ (0, 1] where P˜ represents any arbitrary path and ||P˜ || represents the length
of the path. This is the classic example from variational calculus that a straight
line is the shortest path between two points. Next, we define the least cost,
myopic path as P ∗(ot, xt) = argminP˜ (ot,xt)
∫
P˜ (ot,xt)
α||P˜ || + (1 − α)〈Ft, dP˜ 〉4.
We say least cost, myopic because this formula returns the path that minimizes
the work required to transition from ot to xt while penalizing long paths. In the
context of profit maximization in economics, if we were to execute this transition
in realtime, this trajectory would save us a large amount of money but still
complete in a reasonable amount of time. It is clear by the definitions that∫
P∗(ot,xt)
〈Ft, dP ∗〉 ≤
∫
~P (ot,xt)
〈Ft, d ~P 〉, (8)
and so any algorithms that minimize straight line paths also bound least cost,
myopic paths.
Next, we revisit the standard definition for regret. While it’s still possible
to define regret in the same way as OCO, an alternative definition of regret
arises in the OMO framework that is arguably more appealing. Both notions are
equivalent in the OCO setting. Please consult Figure 2 for a visual during the
following discussion. Standard regret compares the average losses of the online
learning strategy to the best fixed strategy in retrospect (
∫ xt
ot
− ∫ uT
ot
). Another
form of regret could be the loss felt when converting the best fixed strategy to
4α||P˜ || is necessary because monotone maps admit cycles. If Ft is Lipschitz, ∃α s.t. ||P ∗||
is finite.
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ot
uT
xt
Figure 2: Illustrative comparison of alternative regret definition to standard
defintion.
the online learning strategy (
∫ xt
uT
). While these two notions are equivalent in
OCO, they are possibly different in OMO due to path-dependence of general
monotone maps. We will argue for our new notion of regret as it retains a crucial
property. First we provide a proof sketch of a useful integral upper bound over
monotone maps (see [16] for formal proof). Let xi+1−xi = xn−x0n ∀ x0, xn5 and
recall the definition of montonicity, 〈F (xi+1)− F (xi), xi+1 − xi〉 ≥ 0 ∀ xi, xi+1
which implies
〈F (xi), xn − x0
n
〉 ≤ 〈F (xi+1), xn − x0
n
〉 ∀ xi, xi+1 (9)
=⇒ 〈F (xi), xn − x0
n
〉 ≤ 〈F (xj), xn − x0
n
〉 ∀ j ≥ i (10)
Also,
〈F (x0), xn − x0〉 = 〈F (x0),
n−1∑
i=0
xn − x0
n
〉 (11)
=
n−1∑
i=0
〈F (x0), xn − x0
n
〉 (12)
≤
n−1∑
i=0
〈F (xi), xn − x0
n
〉 (13)
=
∫
x:x0→xn
〈F, dx〉 as n→∞, (14)
and vice versa for the reverse direction, which implies
=⇒ 〈F (x0), xn − x0〉 ≤
∫
x:x0→xn
〈F, dx〉 ≤ 〈F (xn), xn − x0〉. (15)
Using this bound, we have that standard regret, regrets =
∫ xt
ot
− ∫ uT
ot
≤
〈F (xt), xt − ot〉 − 〈F (ot), uT − ot〉. Likewise, our new regret, regretn =
∫ xt
uT
≤
5Subscript here simply differentiates vectors. It does not denote a time step.
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〈F (xt), xt − uT 〉 = 〈F (xt), xt − ot〉 − 〈F (xt), uT − ot〉. Unfortunately, there’s
not much we can say regarding the latter terms, 〈F (xt), uT − ot〉, and so it’s
not clear if one of these regrets upper bounds the other. However, we can
bound the difference between the two regrets using Stoke’s theorem and bounds
on F and its derivatives. The difference between the two regrets is equal
to the magnitude of the path integral around the triangle in Figure 2. By
Stoke’s theorem, | ∮
∂Σ
〈F, dx〉| = | ∫
Σ
∇ × F · ∂Σ| ≤ maxΣ |∇ × F | ×
∫
Σ
∂Σ ≤
3
√
1
2 (β
2 + Lγ) · ||uT − ot|| · ||xt − uT || where L, β, and γ are bounds on F , the
Jacobian of F , and a matrix of 2nd derivates respectively and Σ (∂Σ) is the
2-dimensional area (perimeter) formed by the path (see Appendix). The last step
bounds the norm of the curl as well as the area of the triangle. From this bound,
we can see that the closer xt is to uT or the better ot is made to approximate
uT , the smaller the difference.
Our new notion of regret, however, has the nice property that it is independent
of the reference vector ot which will aid our derivation of no-regret algorithms in
the next section. Moreover, we argue our new notion of regret is satisfactory even
when the standard regret exceeds it. If regretn ≥ regrets then any algorithm
that minimizes regretn minimizes regrets as well, so let’s assume, on the contrary,
that regretn < regrets for some choice of vectors ot, xt, uT and map Ft. There
exists a path from ot to xt such that when measuring the loss of xt, ft(xt), the
standard notion of regret is then equal to our new notion. The proof is trivial
since the two segment path from ot to xt through uT exactly gives us this result.
In other words, if the standard regret is greater than the regret given by our
new definition, it is because the standard regret was evaluated along suboptimal
paths and a tighter regret exists which we have explicitly defined. Note that
none of these issues arise in the case where Ft is a conservative, monotone map
as integrals are then path-independent. This discussion is critical for only the
non-conservative case.
In the context of economics, our new notion of regret upper bounds the
amount of money a group of firms should be willing to pay to adjust their
strategies in retrospect. We summarize our new definition here for convenience.
regretA(t,T )(X ) =
∫
x:uT→xt
〈Ft, dx〉 ≤ 〈Ft(xt), xt〉 − 〈Ft(xt), uT 〉 (16)
regretAT (X ) =
T∑
t=1
regretA(t,T )(X ) (17)
uT = argmin
u∈X
T∑
t=1
∫
x:ot→u
〈Ft, dx〉 (18)
3 Derivation of No-Regret Algorithms
Due to the simplicity of the regret bounds discussed in the previous section and
the work previously done in OCO, the derivation of no-regret algorithms for
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Algorithm 4 Online Monotone De-
scent (OMoD)
input: A scalar learning rate η > 0
x1 = 0
for t = 1, 2, . . . do
xt+1 = xt − ηzt where zt ∈
Ft(xt)
end for
Algorithm 5 Online Monotone Mir-
ror Descent (OMoMD)
input: A link function g : Rn → X
x1 = g(0)
for t = 1, 2, . . . do
θt+1 = θt − ηzt where zt ∈
Ft(xt)
xt = g(θt+1)
end for
OMO is trivial. We have shown that immediate regret for general monotone
maps can be bounded above by considering a constant approximation of the
map (see 16). Note that a constant map, Ft, is always the subdifferential of
some linear function, ft = 〈Ft(xt), x〉. This implies that the regret for general
monotone maps is bounded above by considering the online linear optimization
problem with ft. This reduction mirrors that of OCO, where convex losses are
bounded above by their linear approximations. The implication is that the online
gradient decent and even online mirror descent algorithms can be adapted from
OCO with almost no effort to minimize regret in OMO while enjoying exactly
the same o(T ) regret bounds (see end of Section 1 and supplementary material).
This is somewhat surprising as we showed in Section 2 (see 33) that OMO
sometimes involves minimizing non-convex functions. The no-regret algorithms
for OMO are given in Algorithms 4 and 5.
As you can see, the only difference between the new algorithms and those
designed for OCO are that we now allow monotone maps that are not necessarily
subdifferentials of any function. This is further evidence that monotonicity
rather than convexity is a more maximal condition for the development of simple,
efficient, no-regret algorithms.
3.1 Existence of No-regret Algorithms for OMO
As stated above, OMO generally involves minimizing regret for non-convex
functions. Even though this is a surprising result in and of itself, the counterex-
ample we provided actually hides some of the real difficulty of the monotone
optimization problem. In that example, we were able to calculate the definite
integral in closed form, which is an artifact of the example’s simplicity. In general,
computing the best fixed strategy in retrospect (see 18) is by itself a difficult
optimization problem because of the integral. Evaluating the loss as well as
the gradient with respect to a strategy both involve integration. If the integral
cannot be computed in closed form, then it must be integrated numerically
which can be expensive depending on the size of the problem. Furthermore, the
algorithms we present here only require the evaluation of Ft at a single point xt.
Integration, numerical or otherwise, implies that the algorithm needs access to
the map itself which is not always available. In the case where only Ft(xt) is
10
available, our algorithms will still perform with sublinear regret.
4 Experiment
We demonstrate the OMO framework and algorithms on a game-theoretic model
of a cloud-based machine learning network (MLN), which has players (i.e., firms)
compete to maximize profits by adjusting the quantity (e.g., # of samples ×
# of features), quality (e.g., Latency), and price (e.g., $) of data delivered
(see Figure 3). Providers of machine learning data, or service providers, (e.g.,
Twitter, Wikipedia) play a Cournot-Nash game controlling the quantity of data
provided while network providers (e.g., Verizon, AT&T) play a Bertrand game
controlling the delivery price as well as service quality. Consumers (e.g., tech
firms, industrial research labs, universities) influence the network through demand
functions dictating the prices they are willing to pay for specific quantities and
qualities of services rendered. See supplementary material for a more thorough
description of the MLN plus a second demonstration on an environmentally
conscious supply chain.
The firms in the network continuously adjust their respective service offerings,
optimizing their utilities, until any unilateral adjustment attempted by one firm
is inherently detrimental to that firm’s utility function. We assume the governing
equilibrium is Cournot-Bertrand-Nash and firm utility functions are all concave
and fully differentiable. This establishes the equivalence between the equilibrium
state we are searching for and the variational inequality to be solved where
Ft returns a vector consisting of the negative gradients of the utility functions
for each firm. Since Ft is essentially a concatenation of gradients arising from
multiple independent, conflicting objective functions, it does not correspond to
the gradient of any single objective function. This prevents us from phrasing
this equilibrium problem readily as an optimization problem.
To cast this VI as an online learning problem, we allow the parameters of
the network to change. This actually creates a more realistic model as a number
of external factors can cause the network to change such as weather, complex
network congestion effects, cyber attacks, etc. The goal then is to predict
the equilibrium point of each new VI in the face of these possibly adversarial
forces. Specifically, our experiment considers ten different five-firm networks
with monotone Ft. At each time step, the adversary receives the algorithm’s
prediction for the equilibrium point and returns the VI whose equilibrium is
farthest from the predicted one. The reference vectors in this case are the
solutions to the VIs, x∗t . The reference constants are all assumed to be zero
without loss of generality. For obvious reasons, we call this problem an Online
Monotone Equilibration (OME) problem.
As discussed in subsection 3.1, computing the optimal strategy uT is in-
tractable in general. Assuming networks are sampled uniformly in the limit, we
expect uT to be the equilibrium of the network created from averaging the ten
together, and so we treat that equilibrium as uT throughout the experiment.
We measure three losses throughout the learning process. The first, which is an
11
approximation of our new regret (regretn), is the straight line integral from the
current strategy to x¯∗. The second, which is an approximation of the standard
immediate regret (regrets), is the difference between straight line integral from
the reference vector ot to the current strategy minus the straight line integral
from ot to x¯∗. The third is the loss that the system would accrue if the current
network was frozen and the system was allowed to reach the equilibrium x∗t
(loss∞). Figure 4 plots the average of these measures with respect to the time
step. Clearly regretn is decaying towards zero in support of our derived sublinear
bounds.
5 Conclusion & Future Work
We proposed a new framework for online learning, namely online monotone
optimization, which enables the study of regret for monotone maps. This
framework generalizes the popular online convex optimization framework in
a way that allows it to model regret for multiple agents in parallel while still
retaining the simplicity of standard no-regret algorithms from previous work.
We support the efficacy of our new framework with empirical results from a
economic game model.
While we did not discuss it, this work is closely related to that of projected
dynamical systems research. In non-adversarial settings, algorithms developed
for deterministic or stochastic differential equations will better serve the problem.
Our framework is designed to analyze the worst case scenario.
It is interesting to note that OMO has a strong relationship to online linear
optimization just like Blackwell’s Approachability framework and OCO. We are
curious to learn if there is a property more general than monotonicity that is
similarly capable of reducing to a bilinear form.
In future work, we hope to develop the framework further to handle dynamic
regret as well as pseudo-montone maps and certain non-monotone maps. We also
hope to develop efficient algorithms for approximating the optimal strategy uT
in retrospect. Finally, recent work in adversarial networks [10, 7, 2, 9] inspires
us to design monotone adversarial networks that could be trained online.
6 Appendix
6.1 OMoD & OMoMD Regret Bounds
We repeat the bounds adopted from [18] for convenience.
Theorem 2. Let R be a (1/η)-strongly-convex function over X with respect to
a norm || · ||. Assume that OMoMD is run on the sequence of monotone maps,
Ft, with the link function
g(θ) = argmax
x∈X
(〈x, θ〉 −R(x)). (19)
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Figure 3: A next-generation
economic model of a cloud
based machine learning net-
work (MLN) adapted from
the service oriented internet
model proposed in [13].
Figure 4: Demonstration of OMoMD on de-
scribed machine learning network.
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Then, for all u ∈ X ,
regretOMoMDT (X ) ≤ R(uT )−minv∈X R(v) + η
T∑
t=1
||zt||2∗ (20)
Furthermore, if Ft is Lt-Lipschitz with respect to || · ||, then we can further upper
bound ||zt||∗ ≤ Lt.
Proof. As we have shown previously,
regretA(t,T )(X ) =
∫
x:uT→xt
〈Ft, dx〉 ≤ 〈Ft(xt), xt〉 − 〈Ft(xt), uT 〉 (21)
and the OMoMD algorithm is equivalent to running Follow the Regularized
Leader (FoReL) on the sequence of linear functions with the regularization R(x).
The theorem now follows directly from Theorem 2.11 and Lemma 2.6 in [18].
OMoD is equivalent to OMoMD with R(x) = 12 ||x||22 and so the proof for
OMoMD extends to OMoD as well.
6.2 Machine Learning Network Motivation
The example in the paper demonstrates our proposed no-regret algorithm on a
cloud-based machine learning network. Our network is motivated by expectations
of the next era of machine learning. Data is often the difference between a high
performing model and a mediocre one; for some data hungry models (e.g., deep
learning), Big Data launches them to state-of-the-art results. We expect Big
Data to drive a mature digital supply chain capable of supporting an economy
where producers provide data for consumers (i.e., machine learning models) to
consume. Unlike the present, this commodity will not be transferred into local
storage for consumption on personal machines; rather, it will be transmitted in
batches, immediately consumed for training, and discarded to allow room for
the next batch. Our model of a cloud-based machine learning network (MLN)
is trivially adapted from the service oriented internet (SOI) model proposed in
[13]. In the original SOI model, service providers (e.g., Netflix, Amazon) stream
content (e.g., movies, music). In our MLN model, service providers (e.g., Twitter,
Wikipedia) stream machine learning data. Service providers control the quantity
of data (i.e., # of samples × # of features) flowing through the market. Network
providers charge service providers a fee for transmitting their data to consumers.
The price different consumer markets are willing to pay service providers to
stream data over a network of a certain quality is given by demand functions,
price(quantity,quality). Given these relationships, service providers and network
providers attempt to maximize their profits by varying their respective controls
(quantity,quality) over the network. These relationships are parameterized so
that we can instantiate ten five-firm networks by drawing parameters from
uniform distributions over predefined ranges (code on github.com/*****).
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6.3 Supply Chain Experiment
Our second example focuses on an emissions-conscious competitive supply chain
network [14]. In this network model, I firms manufacture products which are
then either transported directly to retailers (demand markets) or to storage
facilities for later distribution. The products in this economy are substitutable
and distinguishable only by brand (eg. oil). In addition, we assume knowledge of
the demand functions stating the prices markets are willing to pay for quantities
of each product. In Figure 5, the nodes from top tier to bottom tier represent
the firms (i), manufacturing plants (M im), storage warehouses (Did,1&D
i
d,2), and
demand markets (Rr). Each link in the network represents a process acting on
the product between the origin and destination nodes. From top tier to bottom
tier, the links represent manufacturing, transportation, storage, and distribution.
Note that each Did,1 and D
i
d,2 pair actually represents the same distribution
center. This is because storage is a process that starts and ends in the same
warehouse, hence the duplication of the nodes.
Each firm must decide how to optimally deliver its product to consumers
given the allowable paths from its firm to the multiple demand markets. They do
this by controlling their product flows (eg. barrels of oil per day) and frequencies
of operation (eg. shipments per day) along paths in the network subject to
capacity constraints (eg. barrels per shipment). For example, firm 1 may decide
on two paths to optimize its supply chain: each day, two 150-barrel shipments
are produced at well 1 and transported using mode 4 (barge) directly to retail
market 1 and six 20-barrel shipments are produced at well 1 as well but are
then transported using mode 3 (truck) to warehouse 2 for storage until they are
finally distributed to retail market 11.
The firms in the network continuously adjust their product flows and operation
frequencies, optimizing their utilities, until any unilateral adjustment attempted
by one firm is inherently detrimental to that firm’s utility function. Rationally
competing on the basis of product output is known as Cournot competition and
the stalemate described is known as a Nash equilibrium hence this state is known
as a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Given each firm’s utility function and capacity
constraints, we aim to find the corresponding steady-state product flows and
frequencies of operation.
We assume the governing equilibrium is Cournot-Nash and the utility func-
tions are all concave and fully differentiable. This establishes the equivalence
between the equilibrium state we are searching for and the variational inequality
to be solved where the Ft mapping is a vector consisting of the negative gra-
dients of the augmented Lagrangian utility functions for each firm. Since Ft
is essentially a concatenation of gradients arising from multiple independent,
conflicting objective functions, it does not correspond to the gradient of any
single objective function. This prevents us from phrasing this problem using a
standard optimization formulation.
The experimental setup is the same as that for the MLN (ten three-firm
networks) with code available on github.com/*****. Figure 6 plots the the same
measures as in the MLN demonstration. Clearly regretn is decaying towards
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Figure 5: A "green" economic model of the supply chain proposed in [14]. Firms
are modeled as playing a Cournot-Nash game, competing on the basis of product
flow and frequency of operation. Demand markets consisting of individuals or
groups of users choose between the various products offered by the firms.
zero in support of our derived sublinear bounds.
6.4 Counterexample Proof
6.4.1 Ft is monotone over X = [0, 1]2
Ft(xt) =
( r2t−rtct+c2t
r2t−rtct+c2t
)
(22)
Jacobian(Ft) =
(
2rt−ct 2ct−rt
2rt−ct 2ct−rt
)
(23)
=
(
a b
a b
)
where a = 2rt − ct and b = 2ct − rt (24)
with eigenvalues λ1,2 = 0, a+ b (25)
λ1,2 = 0, rt + ct ≥ 0 (26)
=⇒ Jacobian(Ft)  0 =⇒ Ft is monotone √ (27)
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Figure 6: Demonstration of OMoMD on described machine learning network.
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6.4.2 ft is non-convex over X = [0, 1]2
ft(x) = fot +
∫
x:ot→xt
〈Ft, dx〉 (28)
=
∫ 1
0
〈Ft(ot + τ(xt − ot)), (xt − ot)dτ〉 (29)
=
1
3
r3t −
1
2
r2t + rtct −
1
2
c2t +
1
3
c3t −
2
3
see Mathematica code
(30)
Hessian(ft) =
(
2rt−1 1
1 2ct−1
)
(31)
=
(
a 1
1 b
)
where a = 2rt − 1 ∈ [−1, 1] and b = 2ct − 1 ∈ [−1, 1]
(32)
Det(Hessian) = ab− 1 ≤ 0 =⇒ ft is a saddle surface (33)
6.4.3 OMO ≡ OCO for Positive Semi-Definite Affine Maps
This concerns such problems as linear complementarity problems (LCPs).
Ft(xt) = Axt + b, where xt, b, ot ∈ Rn, A  0 ∈ Rn×n (34)
ft(xt) = fot +
∫
x:ot→xt
〈Ft, dx〉 (35)
=
∫ 1
0
〈Ft(ot + τ(xt − ot)), (xt − ot)dτ〉 (36)
=
∫ 1
0
〈A(ot + τ(xt − ot)) + b, (xt − ot)dτ〉 (37)
=
∫ 1
0
〈Aot + τA(xt − ot) + b, (xt − ot)dτ〉 (38)
=
∫ 1
0
〈Aot + b, (xt − ot)dτ〉+ τ〈A(xt − ot), (xt − ot)dτ〉 (39)
= 〈Aot + b, (xt − ot)〉+ 1
2
〈A(xt − ot)), (xt − ot)〉 (40)
= oTt A
Txt − oTt AT ot + bT (xt − ot) +
1
2
(xt − ot)TAT (xt − ot)
(41)
= oTt A
Txt − oTt AT ot + bT (xt − ot) + . . . (42)
1
2
[xTt A
Txt − oTt ATxt − xTt AT ot + oTt AT ot] (43)
=
1
2
[xTt A
Txt + x
T
t (A−AT )ot − oTt AT ot] + bT (xt − ot) (44)
Hessian(ft) =
1
2
[A+AT ]  0 =⇒ ft is convex (45)
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6.4.4 Curl Bound
J(F ) =
∂F1∂x1 ∂F1∂x2 ∂F1∂x3∂F2∂x1 ∂F2∂x2 ∂F2∂x3
∂F3
∂x1
∂F2
∂x2
∂F2
∂x3
 (46)
J2(F ) =

∂2F1
∂x21
∂2F1
∂x22
∂2F1
∂x23
∂2F2
∂x21
∂2F2
∂x22
∂2F2
∂x23
∂2F3
∂x21
∂2F2
∂x22
∂2F2
∂x23
 (47)
ρ(A) = largest singular value of A which is square root of largest eigenvalue of ATA
(48)
FR = R · F (49)
||RF ||2 ≤ ||R||2||F ||2 = ||F ||2 all matrix norms are submultiplicative and spectral norm of rotation matrix is 1
(50)
F ′ = 3rd principal submatrix of FR (51)
F’ is a 3rd principal submatrix of rotation of F which means orthogonal projec-
tion after rotation
general principal submatrix spectral bound (with rotation)
Lemma 1
||A′||2max ≤ ||RA||2max because principal submatrix just removing entries
(52)
≤ ||RA||22 ||A||max ≤ ||A||2
(53)
≤ ||R||22||A||22 lp induced norms submultiplicative
(54)
≤ ||A||22 rotation matrix has unit spectral bound
(55)
Lemma 2
||A′||2F ≤ 9||A′||2max
∑
ij
|Aij |2 ≤ n2 max(|Aij |)2 = n2||A||2max (56)
≤ 9||A||2 by Lemma 1 (57)
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Lemma 3
||A′||2,1 =
∑
j
||a′j ||2 ≤
∑
j
||a′j ||1 ||a′||2 ≤ ||a′||1 (58)∑
j
||a′j ||1 =
∑
ij
|a′ij | by definition (59)∑
ij
|a′ij | ≤ 9 max
ij
|a′ij | = 9||A′||max by inspection (60)
≤ 9||A||22 = 9λmax(ATA) by Lemma 1 (61)
20
||∇ × F ′(x)||22 ≤ ||∇||22||F ′(x)||22 ||a× b|| = ||a|| · ||b|| sin θ
(62)
= ∆||F ′(x)||22 ||∇||22 = ∇ · ∇ = ∆
(63)
= ∆
3∑
i=1
F ′i (x)
2 ||F ′(x)||22 = F ′(x) · F ′(x)
(64)
=
3∑
i=1
∆F ′i (x)
2 linearity of ∇2
(65)
= 2
3∑
i=1
3∑
j=1
∂F ′i (x)
∂xj
2
+ F ′i (x)
∂2F ′i (x)
∂x2j
evaluating ∆
(66)
= 2
[
||J(F ′(x))||2F +
3∑
j=1
3∑
i=1
F ′i (x)
∂2F ′i (x)
∂x2j
]
by definition
(67)
= 2
[
||J(F ′(x))||2F +
3∑
j=1
F ′(x) · ∂
2F ′(x)
∂x2j
]
write as dot product
(68)
≤ 2
[
||J(F ′(x))||2F +
3∑
j=1
||F ′(x)||2 · ||∂
2F ′(x)
∂x2j
||2
]
a · b = ||a|| · ||b|| cos θ
(69)
= 2
[
||J(F ′(x))||2F + ||F ′(x)||2
3∑
j=1
||∂
2F ′(x)
∂x2j
||2
]
commutivity
(70)
= 2
[
||J(F ′(x))||2F + ||F ′(x)||2||J2(F ′(x))||2,1
]
by definition
(71)
≤ 2
[
||J(F ′(x))||2F + ||F (x)||2||J2(F ′(x))||2,1
] norm invariant to rotation
vector projection is coercive
(72)
≤ 2
[
9||J(F (x))||22 + ||F (x)||2||J2(F ′(x))||2,1
]
by Lemma 2
(73)
≤ 2
[
9β2 + L||J2(F ′(x))||2,1
]
by definitions
(74)
≤ 2
[
9β2 + 9L||J2(F (x))||2
]
by Lemma 3
(75)
≤ 18(β2 + Lγ) by definitions
(76)
||∇ × F ′(x)||2 ≤
√
18(β2 + Lγ) take square root
(77)
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